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ARTICLES
ANTITRUST AND TRADE REGULATION LAW
Michael F. Urbanski*
James R. Creekmore**
I. INTRODUCTION
During the past year, this country has devoted much attention,
with good reason, to the Microsoft trial and appeal.' Not since the
breakup of Ma Bell's stronghold on the telecommunications in-
dustry in the early 1980s has a single legal battle posed so sig-
nificant a change for both an industry and its consumers. In fact,
given the far-reaching effects of this decision on other related in-
dustries and consumers, it likely will be years before its ultimate
impact can be assessed.
As media, industry and legal pundits alike debate the particu-
lars of the remedy phase of the Microsoft trial and Judge Thomas
Penfield Jackson's ruling dividing the company, all of which may
seem extreme, attorneys in the trenches recognize this aggressive
posture as fairly typical of efforts by federal, state, and local offi-
Principal, Woods, Rogers & Hazlegrove, P.L.C., Roanoke, Virginia. A.B., 1978,
College of William and Mary;, J.D., 1981, University of Virginia School of Law. Mr. Urban-
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University of Virginia; J.D., 1993, College of William and Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of
Law. Mr. Creekmore is a member of the Business Litigation Practice Group at Woods,
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cials to enforce antitrust laws. In 1999, the federal and state
courts in the Commonwealth of Virginia and throughout this fed-
eral judicial circuit considered antitrust allegations in a wide
range of contexts, including those involving the pharmaceutical,
electronics, finance, health care, trucking, distribution, Internet,
and chemical industries. As shown below, the resulting court bat-
tles often produced mixed results and confusing signals for coun-
sel who assume the role of guiding their clients through this
minefield.
In addition, Virginia's state courts have seen an increasing
number of suits alleging violations of the Virginia Business Con-
spiracy Act,2 a broad statute prohibiting conspiracies to harm an-
other person in his or her trade, business, or profession.3 Recent
court decisions include one concerning a group of accountants
who chose to leave their former firm, and another involving the
unauthorized use, for competitive purposes, of confidential infor-
mation obtained during the course of discussions regarding a con-
templated corporate acquisition. These and other cases highlight
the increasing use of this Act's powerful legal remedies.
This article addresses antitrust and other trade regulation de-
cisions of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, and state and fed-
eral courts of Virginia over the past year, as well as legislative
developments and enforcement efforts in this field of law.
II. FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
A. Sherman Act: Group Boycott
In Merck-Medco Managed Care, LLC v. Rite Aid Corp.,4 the
State of Maryland awarded a contract to Medco to manage a pre-
scription drug benefits program for State employees and retirees.'
Under the terms of the agreement, Medco was required to form a
network of pharmacies across the state to fill prescription drug
orders for Plan participants at steep discounts.6 At the outset of
2. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-499 to -501 (Repl. Vol. 1996 & Cur. Supp. 2000).
3. Id.
4. No. 98-2847, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 21487 (4th Cir. Sept. 7, 1999).
5. Id. at *2-3.
6. Id.
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Plan negotiations, Medco predicted that it could successfully en-
roll over 800 pharmacies in its network.7 When Medco was unable
to establish the network, the State rebid the contract and
awarded it to Rite Aid, one of Medco's competitors.' Medco there-
after filed an action against Rite Aid and others whom it alleged
jointly agreed to sabotage Medco's Plan by boycotting Medco's
network in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act and the
Maryland Antitrust Act
On cross motions for summary judgment, the district court, in
an eighty-three page opinion, granted Rite Aid's motion for sum-
mary judgment, finding that Medco's evidence did not exclude the
possibility of independent conduct on behalf of the defendants.' °
Medco appealed, however, asserting that numerous actions by the
defendants constituted a conspiracy." Medco offered testimony
that included an advertisement by defendants in two prominent
newspapers and conference calls, as well as other communica-
tions between the more than 450 allegedly conspiring pharmacies
within the three month period preceding the termination of
Medco's Plan by the state.1
2
Recognizing that Medco must establish that at least two per-
sons acted in concert, and that the restraint complained of consti-
tuted an unreasonable restraint on trade or commerce, 3 the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals noted the heightened burden on
an antitrust plaintiff in this regard.'4 The court stated that "'anti-
trust law limits the range of permissible inferences from ambigu-
ous evidence in a § 1 case... conduct as consistent with permis-
sible competition as with illegal conspiracy does not, standing
alone, support an inferenced of antitrust conspiracy.""' 5
Turning first to the "unreasonable restraint of trade" element
of Medco's case, the court agreed with Medco's characterization of
7. Id. at *6.
. Id. at *3.
9. Id. at *7; see generally 15 U.S.C. § 1 (West 1997); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw IX §
11-201 to -213 (1999).
10. Medco, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 21487, at *7.
11. Id.
12. Id. at *7-8.
13. Id. at *12.
14. Id.
15. Id. (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587
(1986)).
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defendants' conduct as a per se violation of section 1, thereby ob-
viating a rule-of-reason analysis of the defendants' alleged anti-
competitive conduct.'6 The court then directed its focus to the re-
maining inquiry-whether Medco had, in fact, established a
conspiracy by the defendants. 17
Referring to the Matsushita standard, the court observed that,
"to withstand a motion for summary judgment, 'a plaintiff seek-
ing damages for a violation of § 1 must present evidence that
tends to exclude the possibility that the alleged competitors acted
independently.'"'8 Medco attempted to argue, however, that it
need not produce evidence that tends to exclude the possibility of
independent conduct by defendants 9 based on the Supreme
Court's more recent decision in Eastman Kodak v. Image Techni-
cal Services.2 ° The court of appeals, however, dismissed this ar-
gument as too sweeping a reading of Eastman Kodak,2' specifi-
cally noting that there was no section 1 conspiracy at issue in
Eastman, as in Matsushita and Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv-
ice Corp.,22 the two conspiracy cases from which the standard
emerged.23
Addressing Medco's factual arguments in support of its con-
spiracy theory, the court noted that an agreement to boycott may
be inferred from a pattern of business conduct or practices of the
parties referred to as "conscious parallelism'-the defendants'
behavior was parallel and the defendants' awareness of this par-
allelism was an element of their decision-making process.' In or-
der to sustain this theory, the court found that Medco was also
required to demonstrate what it referred to as "plus factors," such
as motive to conspire, opportunity to conspire, a high level of in-
16. Id. at *13 & n.1. The court noted that most horizontal boycotts have been consid-
ered per se violations, and that the conduct alleged by defendants fell squarely within that
ambit given the necessarily adverse affect on competition that would have resulted if the
defendants had committed the alleged conduct. The court further noted that only those
boycotts having valid business justifications and procompetitive effects may be considered
under a rule of reason analysis. Id. at *13 n.1.
17. Id. at *13.
18. Id. at *15 (quoting Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588).
19. Id. at *17-21.
20. 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
21. Medco, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 21487, at *21.
22. 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
23. Medco, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 21487, at *21.
24. Id. at *25.
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ter-firm communications, irrational acts, or acts contrary to the
defendants' economic interest, as well as a departure from normal
business practices." Although the court found that Medco sus-
tained its burden of demonstrating motive and opportunity to
conspire and a high level of inter-firm contacts, the court found
that the refusal of the pharmacies to participate in Medco's Plan
was not a departure from normal business practices or contrary
to their economic interests.26 Nevertheless, Medco's establishment
of two "plus factors" required Rite Aid to rebut the resulting in-
ference of conspiracy, which, on the evidence presented, the court
found it had done.
Finally, the court of appeals found that Medco failed to meet its
burden of producing evidence tending to exclude the possibility of
independent action by the defendant pharmacies, thereby falling
short of its ultimate summary judgment burden of creating a rea-
sonable inference of conspiracy.2 The court thus affirmed the
judgment of the district court dismissing Medco's group boycott
claim. 29
B. Robinson-Patman Act: Price Discrimination
In Hoover Color Corp. v. Bayer Corp.,3  the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the District Court for
the Western District of Virginia's grant of summary judgment in
a case arising under the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robin-
son-Patman Anti-Discrimination Act.3 Plaintiff Hoover Color
Corporation is a buyer and distributor of Bayferrox, a synthetic
iron-oxide used as a pigment in color paints, plastics, and build-
ing and concrete products.32 Hoover alleged that its supplier,
Bayer Corporation, discriminated against Hoover in favor of
larger distributors by implementing a volume incentive-based
discount-pricing scheme.33 The district court granted summary
25. Id. at *26.
26. Id. at *27-31.
27. Id. at *35.
28. Id. at *42.
29. Id. at *44.
30. 199 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 1999).
31. Id. at 161; 15 U.S.C. § 813-13(b), 21(a) (1994).
32. 199 F.3d at 161.
33. Id.
20001
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judgment in favor of Bayer, accepting its defense that its pricing
scheme was justified as "meeting competition" in the marketplace
by offering lower prices on high-volume orders. 4
Reversing the district court, the court of appeals noted at the
outset that "Congress enacted the Robinson-Patman Act to pre-
vent a large buyer from 'securing a competitive advantage over a
small buyer solely because of the large buyer's quantity purchas-
ing ability."'35 The court held that if a buyer makes a prima facie
case of price discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act, a
seller can overcome the allegation by demonstrating that it has
set its prices in a "good faith attempt to 'meet an equally low price
of a competitor."'36 Nevertheless, despite Bayer's largely undis-
puted evidence that: (1) the market was competitive with other
suppliers giving volume discounts; (2) large buyers demanded
lower volume prices to match competing bids; and (3) such buyers
gave statements that they would not purchase from Bayer unless
they offered volume discounts,37 the court of appeals ruled that
Bayer's evidence did not rise to the level of that presented in Re-
serve Supply Corp. v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp.,3 in which
summary judgment for the seller on the meeting competition de-
fense was upheld.39 Because the court determined that Hoover
had also presented sufficient evidence of alternative motives for
Bayer's pricing, thereby creating issues of fact, the case was re-
versed and remanded for trial. 40
Although Bayer petitioned the United States Supreme Court
for certiorari, the Supreme Court declined the manufacturer's re-
quest for review.41
C. Robinson-Patman Act: Commercial Bribe
In Patterson v. Ford Motor Credit Co.,42 the Fourth Circuit
34. Hoover Color Corp. v. Baylor Corp., 24 F. Supp. 2d 571, 585 (W.D. Va. 1998), rev'd,
199 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 1999).
35. Hoover, 199 F.3d at 162 (quoting FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 43 (1948)).
36. Id. at 163 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1994)).
37. Id. at 166.
38. 971 F.2d 37 (7th Cir. 1992).
39. Hoover, 199 F.3d at 166-67.
40. Id. at 167.
41. Bayer Corp. v. Hoover Color Corp., 120 S. Ct. 2198 (2000).
42. No. 98-2774, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 1303 (4th Cir. Feb. 2, 2000).
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Court of Appeals affirmed a decision of the District Court for the
Southern District of West Virginia granting summary judgment
to defendants in a Robinson-Patman Act case.43 The plaintiffs,
purchasers of a sports-utility vehicle from a dealer, alleged that
the dealer offered plaintiffs an installment agreement at an in-
terest rate above that which the dealer knew defendant, Ford Mo-
tor Credit Company ("FMCC"), would extend on the same con-
tract.4 Plaintiffs alleged that after securing the installment
contract at the higher interest rate, the dealer assigned the con-
tract to FMCC, and in return received the difference between the
higher rate and the lower rate FMCC would extend as a "dis-
count" or "dealer's participation" fee.45 Plaintiffs thereafter sued,
contending that the discount amounted to an unlawful commer-
cial bribe from FMCC to the dealer, whom plaintiffs alleged occu-
pied the role of their agent, in violation of section 2(c) of the
Robinson-Patman Act. 6
Consistent with the holdings in a series of prior cases,4' the dis-
trict court dismissed plaintiffs' claim, holding that the Robinson-
Patman Act bars price discrimination only on the sale of tangible
assets, and the assignment of the contract to and payment of the
fee by FMCC did not involve a tangible good.' Plaintiffs argued
that the "dominant nature" of the transaction was the sale of a
tangible good, and that the subsequent sale of the contract arose
from the original vehicle sale, such that the Act should apply.49
The court of appeals rejected plaintiffs' argument that the two
transactions should be viewed as one transaction, given that
FMCC was clearly not a party to the vehicle sale, and the subse-
quent sale of the financing agreement did not involve a tangible
asset.50
Even assuming that the two-part transaction could be viewed
as a single transaction, the court noted that plaintiffs' claim must
43. Id. at *12-13.
44. Id. at *3.
45. Id.
46. Id. at *4.
47. Harris v. Duty Free Shoppers Ltd. P'ship, 940 F.2d 1272, 1274 (9th Cir. 1991);
Union City Barge Line, Inc. v. Union Carbide Corp., 823 F.2d 129, 140-41 (5th Cir. 1987);
Freeman v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 505 F.2d 527, 529-31 (7th Cir. 1974) (per curiam).
48. Patterson, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 1303, at *7-8.
49. Id. at *12.
50. Id. at *10-11.
2000]
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fail because the alleged bribe would not traverse the "seller-
buyer" line, which is an essential element for a commercial brib-
ery claim. 1 The court rejected plaintiffs' position that the dealer
could be adverse to plaintiffs on the sale while simultaneously
acting as agent of the plaintiffs for financing purposes.52 Thus,
the court concluded the FMCC transaction simply was not a cov-
ered transaction under the Robinson-Patman Act and affirmed
the district court's judgment.53
D. Sherman Act, Clayton Act: Price Fixing
In Audio Visual Associates, Inc. v. Sharp Electronics Corp.,'
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a grant of summary
judgment for the defendant in a price-fixing case. 5 Plaintiff, a re-
tailer of electronic products, including those of defendant Sharp
Electronics, contracted to sell Sharp calculators to a "disadvan-
taged small business concern" that, in turn, had contracted to sell
such products to the United States Navy.56 Sharp quoted plaintiff
a price of thirty-one dollars per unit before ultimately rescinding
the quote and referring plaintiff to another of its distributors to
purchase the units.5" That distributor initially quoted plaintiff a
price of twenty-nine dollars and ninety-five cents per calculator,
but rescinded that quote and informed plaintiff that the price
would be thirty-one dollars because "Sharp says $31.00 is the
fixed price."58 Plaintiff purchased the units at the thirty-one dol-
lar price and sued Sharp for price-fixing, among other claims."
As to plaintiffs price-fixing claims, the court of appeals noted
that the totality of plaintiffs antitrust allegation consisted of the
claim that "based upon Sharp's intervention with the [distributor]
the price was changed to $31.00 per unit."" Citing Monsanto Co.
v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.6 and United States v. Colgate & Co.,62
51. Id. at *11.
52. Id. at *12.
53. Id. at *12-13.
54. 210 F.3d 254 (4th Cir. 2000).
55. Id. at 262.
56. Id. at 256.
57. Id. at 257.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 262.
61. 465 U.S. 752, 764 n.9 (1984). In Monsanto, the court held that
[Tihe concept of"a meeting of the minds" or "a common scheme" in a distribu-
tor-termination case includes more than a showing that the distributor con-
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the court of appeals found that these allegations were insufficient
to allege an illegal price-fixing arrangement.63 Accordingly, the
court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs com-
plaint.
E. Virginia Business Conspiracy Act
In Wuchenich v. Shenandoah Memorial Hospital,65 plaintiff, an
anesthesiologist, appealed from an order of the United States
District Court for the Western District of Virginia dismissing his
complaint against the defendant hospital and individual doctors,
in which plaintiff alleged, among other claims, that the hospital
and physicians had conspired to procure the revocation of plain-
tiffs medical staff privileges at defendant hospital in violation of
the Virginia Business Conspiracy Act66 and the common law.67
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed plaintiffs
conspiracy allegations-that two of defendant anesthesiologists
failed to assign plaintiff a fair share of the patient load; that one
other defendant physician instigated peer review of two of plain-
tiffs cases without just cause; and that defendant hospital sus-
pended plaintiffs privileges without just cause-and noted that
the intracorporate immunity bar clearly applied given that all
three individual physicians were acting within their agency
authority from the hospital."
The issue therefore turned on whether plaintiff established
formed to the suggested price. It means as well that evidence must be pre-
sented both that the distributor communicated its acquiescence or agree-
ment, and that this was sought by the manufacturer.
Id.
62. 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919) (holding that the Sherman Act does not restrict a manu-
facturer's right to "announce in advance the circumstances under which he will refuse to
sell").
63. Audio Visual, 210 F.3d at 262.
64. Id.
65. No. 99-1273, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 11557 (4th Cir. Jan. 28, 2000) (per curiam).
66. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-499 to -501 (Repl. Vol. 1996). Virginia's conspiracy statute
provides, in relevant part, that "[any two or more persons who combine, associate, agree,
mutually undertake or concert together for the purpose of... willfully and maliciously
injuring another in his reputation, trade, business or profession by any means whatever"
shall be liable civilly for treble damages. Id. § 18.2-499 (Repl. Vol. 1996). A plaintiff must
prove that defendant acted "intentionally, purposefully and without lawful justification" to
establish liability under the Act. Commercial Bus. Sys., Inc. v. BellSouth Serv. Inc., 249
Va. 39, 47, 453 S.E.2d 261, 267 (1995). For a more extensive discussion of the Act and re-
cent cases decided thereunder, see Michael F. Urbanski, Antitrust and Trade Regulation
Law, 33 U. RICH. L. REv. 769 (1999).
67. Wuchenich, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 11557, at *19-21.
68. Id. at *40.
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that the physicians had "an independent personal stake in
achieving the corporation's illegal objective" in order to overcome
the intracorporate immunity bar.69 Based on the authority and
parallel facts of Oksanen v. Page Memorial Hospital, ° the court
summarily found that the personal stake exception did not apply
to plaintiffs claims that were premised on the decision to suspend
his medical privileges or one doctor's instigation of peer review of
two of plaintiffs cases, given the fact that the hospital Board re-
tained decision-making authority with regard to staff privileges,
and review was disbursed among various committees that did not
include the defendant physicians.7 The court found, however,
that the personal stake exception may apply to plaintiffs allega-
tion that two other defendant physicians refused to allot plaintiff
a fair patient load, by which it could be argued that those defen-
dant physicians were attempting to reduce direct competition by
plaintiff." The court of appeals therefore vacated the district
court's order in this regard, remanding the case for further pro-
ceedings.73
With respect to plaintiffs common law conspiracy allegations,
whereby plaintiff alleged that defendants collectively conspired to
breach the hospital's duty to abide by its bylaws in suspending
medical staff privileges,74 the court of appeals affirmed the ruling
of the district court." Noting that plaintiff had failed to allege
any conduct by the individual physician defendants taken in con-
cert with the hospital, or with each other, that reasonably could
have been viewed as supporting a claim for conspiracy to cause
the hospital to breach the obligations of its bylaws, the court af-
firmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs common law con-
spiracy claim.76
69. Greenville Publ'g Co. v. Daily Reflector, Inc., 496 F.2d 391, 399 (4th Cir. 1974).
70. 945 F.2d 696 (4th Cir. 1991) (en banc).
71. Wuchenich, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 11557, at *41.
72. Id.
73. Id. at *42.
74. The court of appeals, reversing the district court, found that plaintiff had stated a
viable claim alleging that defendant hospital breached its contractual obligations to abide
by its bylaws in suspending plaintiffs medical staff privileges. Id. at *30-3 1.
75. Id. at *44.
76. Id. at *43-44.
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F. Franchising Case
In Tom Hughes Marine, Inc. v. Honda Motor Co.," the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's grant of
summary judgment in a case where a dealer of Honda outboard
motors near Columbia, South Carolina, claimed that Honda had
verbally promised him an exclusive geographic territory of un-
limited duration." When Honda placed a new dealer nearby, the
plaintiff sued in tort on theories of fraudulent and negligent mis-
representation, in an apparent attempt to circumvent the fact
that the integrated dealer agreement contained no exclusivity
provision." Noting that the plaintiff was a "sophisticated busi-
nessman" who was "reckless" in failing to read the dealer agree-
ment before signing it, the court of appeals held that dismissal of
the claims was proper.8" The court found that Honda's alleged
verbal commitments constituted "promises" of future actions that
could support a breach of contract action in the appropriate case
but were not representations of existing fact that could support
the tort claims alleged.8"
III. VIRGINIA FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS
A. Virginia Business Conspiracy Act
In Lilly v. Sisk,82 plaintiffs were owners of two well-established
trucking companies that transport paper products for approxi-
mately 80 to 100 customers.' For several years, plaintiffs insured
their trucks through an insurance company that employed defen-
dants Mark Sisk and Jeff Sisk.' In June 1998, plaintiffs began
negotiations with Mark Sisk for the sale of their trucking busi-
ness. 5 During the negotiations, the parties signed a letter of in-
tent that prohibited Sisk from using information about the plain-
77. 219 F.3d 321 (4th Cir. 2000).
78. Id. at 322.
79. Id.
80. Id.
8L Id. at 325-26.
82. No. 99-0023-C, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8263 (W.D. Va. Apr. 9, 1999).
83. Id. at *3.
84. Id.
85. Id. at *4.
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tiffs' businesses for any purpose other than evaluating those com-
panies." The letter of intent also required Sisk to return all
documents he received from plaintiffs during their negotiations. 7
Prior to his involvement with plaintiffs, Sisk had no experience
in the specialty trucking business.' Since the negotiations were
ongoing, Mark Sisk had participated in various aspects of plain-
tiffs' trucking businesses in an effort to become more familiar
with the plaintiffs' business.8 9 Sisk became a contract hauler for
plaintiffs and purchased at least one tractor-trailer marked with
plaintiffs name.9" Plaintiffs also introduced Sisk to numerous
customers, demonstrated methods of contracting with customers,
provided dispatch software and sample forms, and permitted Sisk
to accompany them at least once on interviews with prospective
drivers.9
In March 1999, plaintiffs became concerned that defendants
were soliciting business using customer lists and contact informa-
tion obtained both during the negotiations with Mark Sisk and
during their employment with the plaintiffs' insurance com-
pany.92 Plaintiffs discovered that defendants had started a new
company called "Willie Trucking," and had contracted with some
of plaintiffs' customers.93 Plaintiffs immediately filed suit against
defendants and their new company alleging claims for breach of
contract, tortious interference with their business, and conspiracy
to injure the plaintiffs in their trade or business in violation of
the Virginia Business Conspiracy Act.94 Plaintiffs then sought a
preliminary injunction to prevent defendants from soliciting
business from any more of plaintiffs' regular customers.95
Applying the test articulated in Blackwelder Furniture Co. v.
Seilig Manufacturing. Co.,96 the district court had little difficulty
finding that the granting of a preliminary injunction was war-
86. Id.
87. Id. at *5.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at *5-6.
93. Id.
94. Id. at *1; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-499 to -501 (Repl. Vol. 1996).
95. Lilly, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8263, at *3.
96. 550 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1977).
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ranted." The court found that defendants had doctored brochures
and other business documents used by plaintiffs, and had used
plaintiffs' price schedules and contract terms to structure rela-
tions with some of plaintiffs' customers and to undercut plaintiffs'
prices.9" For these reasons, the court enjoined defendants from
soliciting business from any of plaintiffs' customers and ordered
defendants to cease from using plaintiffs' information or docu-
ments and ordered them to return all such materials to plain-
tiffs.
99
B. Trade Regulation: Cybersquatting Remedies
In Dorer v. Arel, °° plaintiff Dorer sued Arel for trademark in-
fringement for, among other things, using plaintiffs trademark in
an Internet domain name registered by defendant with Network
Solutions, Inc. ("NSI"), a Virginia-based domain name registry.''
Defendant failed to respond to the suit, and the magistrate rec-
ommended an award of $5,000 in damages and ordered that de-
fendant be permanently enjoined from future use of plaintiffs
trademark, a recommendation which was adopted by the District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.10 2
Plaintiff then sought to execute upon defendant's infringing
domain name in partial satisfaction of the judgment they had ob-
tained.0 3 Plaintiff argued that the domain name was intangible
personal property of the defendant, and therefore subject to the
writ of fieri facias under Virginia law, just as are bonds, notes
and stocks.0 4 Acknowledging the issue as one of first impression,
the district court explored the nature of the writ and its applica-
tion to intellectual property, such as domain names.0
Referring to trademark law by analogy, the court found that
because the trademark owner does not own the words used in the
mark, a judgment creditor cannot levy upon and sell such marks
97. See Lilly, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8263, at *21.
98. Id. at *6-7.
99. Id. at *21.
100. 60 F. Supp. 2d 558 (E.D. Va. 1999).
101. Id. at 558-59.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104, Id. at 559.
105. Id.
2000l
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of a judgment debtor."6 Similarly, the court found that some do-
main names were little more than addresses, with no independ-
ent value, and manifest nothing of a tangible nature upon which
an executing official could seize, in contrast to a stock or a bond
that is represented by a tangible certificate. 1 7 On the other hand,
the court recognized that other domain names were valuable
commercial assets in and of themselves, given that they could be
transferred apart from their content and, for various reasons de-
pending upon the actual words used, could have great commercial
appeal.'08 The court also examined patent law for guidance, but
rejected its application, even by analogy, given the fact that a
patent did have an intrinsic value-the right to exclude all others
from making, using, or selling an invention covered thereby.' 9
Ultimately, however, the court avoided the "knotty issue of
whether a domain name is personal property subject to the lien of
fieri facias"" ° by suggesting that plaintiff seek to have the do-
main name registration transferred to her by NSI pursuant to
NSI's own policies, apparently developed in expectation of such
intellectual property disputes."' The court expressed its opinion
that the judgment entered in plaintiffs favor was sufficient evi-
dence of her rights in the domain name under the trademark
laws, and that the service of process requirements of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure should satisfy NSI's notice require-
ment." The court therefore deferred ruling on plaintiffs motion
to compel transfer of the domain name "pending plaintiffs re-
course to the self-help method suggested in this opinion.""'
C. Trade Regulation: Truth in Lending, Consumer Protection Act
In Crews v. Altavista Motors, Inc.,"' plaintiffs William and
Shelby Crews agreed to buy a truck from defendant Altavista Mo-
tors ("the Dealer") and agreed to finance their purchase via a Re-
106. Id. at 561 (construing 30 AM. JUR. 2D Executions and Enforcement of Judgements
§ 160 (1994)).
107. Id. at 561 n.8.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 561 n.9.
110. Id. at 561.
111. Id. at 562.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. 65 F. Supp. 2d 388 (W.D. Va. 1999).
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tail Installment Sales Contract ("RISC"). 5 The Dealer made sev-
eral changes to the terms of the deal both before and after the
plaintiffs had signed the RISC, changes which plaintiffs alleged
constituted violations of both the Truth in Lending Act" 6 and the
Virginia Consumer Protection Act,"7 and gave rise to a claim for
fraud." 8 Plaintiffs later joined as a defendant the First National
Bank of Altavista ("the Bank"), the current holder of the note on
the vehicle purchased by the plaintiffs, and sought to hold the
Bank liable for all of the Dealer's violations except those involv-
ing the Truth in Lending Act."9 Plaintiffs also sought actual,
statutory, and punitive damages from both the Dealer and the
Bank.2 ° The Bank immediately filed a motion to dismiss.'2 '
The court began its analysis by noting that the RISC between
plaintiffs and the Dealer contained what is commonly known as
the FTC Holder Rule ("Holder Rule"):
NOTICE
ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT CONTRACT IS
SUBJECT TO ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES WHICH THE
DEBTOR COULD ASSERT AGAINST THE SELLER OF GOODS
OR SERVICES OBTAINED PURSUANT HERETO OR WITH THE
PROCEEDS HEREOF. RECOVERY HEREUNDER BY THE
DEBTOR SHALL NOT EXCEED AMOUNTS PAID BY THE
DEBTOR HEREUNDER. 
22
The court pointed out that this provision, which is mandated by
the FTC to be included in all RISCs, acts as a shield for consum-
ers, protecting them from creditors by allowing non-payment
when a seller has defrauded the consumer in some way.2 3 The
court also noted that the Holder Rule can sometimes be used by
consumers as a sword. 24 The court decided that the issue in the
instant case was whether the plaintiffs could use the Holder Rule
against the Bank.125
115. Id. at 389.
116. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
117. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-196 to -207 (Repl. Vol. 1998).
118. Crews, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 388.
119. Id. at 390.
120. Id.
121 Id.
122. Id. (quoting 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (2000)).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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The court ultimately ruled that plaintiffs could not use the
Holder Rule to make a claim against the Bank under the facts
pleaded.126 Although the Holder Rule provides relief against a
creditor where the seller's breach is so substantial that rescission
and restitution are justified, the court found that plaintiffs alle-
gations in the instant case did not rise to that level. 27 Moreover,
the court noted that, in any event, plaintiffs were not seeking re-
scission of the contract." In fact, the court found that plaintiffs
had kept the vehicle they purchased from the Dealer and contin-
ued to use it.' 29 Finally, the court agreed that the Holder Rule
"was not designed to act as a weapon to exact statutory and puni-
tive damages against otherwise innocent creditors" like the
Bank.130
D. Lanham Act: False Advertising
In Maday v. Toll Bros., Inc.,' 31 plaintiff Maday contracted to
purchase from defendants what plaintiff believed was a stucco
house.' 32 When it turned out that the home's facade was not
stucco, but rather a synthetic substitute, Maday filed suit against
the defendants for, among other allegations, a violation of the
federal prohibition of false advertising found in the Lanham
Act. 133
Defendants moved to dismiss plaintiffs lawsuit for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, asserting that section 1125(a) of the
Lanham Act provides a remedy for commercial injuries only.'3 4
126. Id. at 391.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. 72 F. Supp. 2d 599 (E.D. Va. 1999).
132. Id. at 600.
133. Id.; 60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
134. Maday, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 601. Section 1125(a) states:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any con-
tainer for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device,
or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or mis-
leading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact,
which-... (2) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the
nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another
person's goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil ac-
tion by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by
such act.
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Defendants argued that plaintiff had no standing to assert a
cause of action under the Lanham Act.'35 The district court
agreed, noting that every circuit that had confronted the issue
had reached the same conclusion, namely that standing to bring a
Lanham Act claim is restricted to commercial injury."6 While
recognizing that the specific language of section 1125 alone may
not be clear on the issue, the court insisted that the section "must
be construed, and its scope determined, by reference to Congress'
purpose in enacting the Act as a whole."' The court noted that "§
1127 makes clear [that] § 1125 is a remedy only for commercial
injuries," and not for injuries to consumers such as Maday.138
E. Trade Regulation: Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection
Act
In Virtual Works, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc.,19 plaintiffs
registered Internet domain name was "VW.NET." 4 ° Plaintiff filed
suit against Network Solutions, Inc. ("NSI"), an Internet domain
name registration firm in Herndon, Virginia, Volkswagen of
America, and Volkswagen AG ("Volkswagen") for tortiously inter-
fering with its rights in its domain name.' Volkswagen re-
sponded with "a counterclaim against Virtual Works for Cyberpi-
racy, Trademark Dilution, and Trademark Infringement" under
the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act ("ACPA).
Both parties filed cross motions for summary judgment."
Reviewing the many factors set forth in the ACPA, the District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted summary
judgment in favor of Volkswagen, holding that: (1) "Volkswagen
[was] the only entity [of the two] with any intellectual property
rights in the trademark VW;' (2) that Virtual Works' use of the
domain name... 'created a likelihood of confusion" among con-
sumers, and (3) that plaintiff had used the mark to disparage
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994 & Supp. 2000).
135. Maday, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 601.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 602.
138. Id.
139. 106 F. Supp. 2d 845 (E.D. Va. 2000).
140. Id. at 846.
14L Id.
142. Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (a), (c) (2000).
143. Virtual Works, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 846.
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Volkswagen.'" Based on these findings, the district court con-
cluded that Virtual Works had violated the ACPA. 4 5 Moreover,
these findings, plus evidence of actual confusion, led the court to
conclude that Virtual Works' use of the domain name also in-
fringed upon Volkswagen's trademark.'46 Finally, agreeing that
Internet cyber-piracy constitutes per se trademark dilution, the
court found that Volkswagen had suffered "economic harm as a
result of not being able to use VW.NET" and as a result of the
dilution of its trademark. 47
In Caesars World, Inc. v. Caesars-Palace.com,148 the District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia rejected various consti-
tutional challenges to the in rem provisions of the ACPA." The
court first addressed the argument that "in rem jurisdiction is
only constitutional in those circumstances where the res provides
minimum contacts sufficient for in personam jurisdiction." 50
Citing Shaffer v. Heitner,'5' the court ruled that there must be
minimum contacts to support personal jurisdiction "only in those
in rem proceedings where the underlying cause of action is unre-
lated to the property that is located in the forum state."52 The
court noted that because the domain name at issue in the case is
"not only related to the cause of action but is its entire subject
matter," the assertion of minimum contacts necessary to meet
personal jurisdiction standards is unnecessary. 53 The court then
pointed out that those contacts required in this situation were
supplied by the fact of domain name registration with Network
Solutions, Inc., a company located in Virginia.'54
The court also rejected the argument that "a domain name
registration is not a proper kind of thing to serve as a res."155
Noting that "[t]here is no prohibition on a legislative body making
something property[, the court concluded that] [e]ven if a domain
name is no more than data, Congress was within its authority to
144. Id. at 847-48.
145. Id. at 848.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1121 (E.D. Va. 2000).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1122.
151. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
152. Caesars, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1122.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1123.
155. Id.
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make data property and assign its place of registration as its si-
tus .,,156
The court next addressed the argument that, under the ACPA,
a "plaintiff must have first filed an action against a person [as
opposed to a domain name], attempted personal service, and
served the action by publication if personal service was not possi-
ble.""' Additionally, the defendant argued that a "plaintiff [must]
seek permission from the court... and.., establish that the
challenged domain name violates the rights of the plaintiff before
filing an in rem [action]."'58 Pointing out that requiring a plaintiff
to leap through these preliminary hoops would "stand the Act on
its head," the court rejected both arguments with little com-
ment.' 59
In a third case arising under the ACPA, Lucent Technologies,
Inc. v. Lucentsucks.com, 60 Russell Johnson registered the domain
name "lucentsucks.com" with Network Solutions, Inc. ("NSI"). 6'
Sometime in the following year, counsel for Lucent Technologies,
Inc. ("Lucent"), the owner of the registered trademark
"LUCENT," learned of Johnson's use of the Lucent name in his
registered domain name.'62 On November 11, 1999, Lucent's in-
house counsel sent a cease and desist letter to Johnson via Fed-
eral Express to the address Johnson had listed with NSI' 63 That
letter was returned as undeliverable."
On December 8, 1999, Lucent's in-house counsel sent another
letter and an e-mail to the addresses Johnson listed with NSI,
again requesting that he cease and desist from using the Lucent
name and trademarks.1' Eight days later, Lucent filed an in rem
action against the domain name under the ACPA, asserting
claims of trademark infringement and trademark dilution. 6 6 Lu-
cent asked the court to direct NSI to transfer registration of "lu-
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. 95 F. Supp. 2d 528 (E.D. Va. 2000).
161. Id. at 529.
162. See id. at 530.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 529, 531.
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centsucks.com" to Lucent.
167
In response, defendant filed a motion to dismiss for failure to
satisfy the in rem jurisdictional requirements of the ACPA, stat-
ing that Lucent had filed its lawsuit too soon after sending its
cease and desist notice.'" After reviewing the jurisdictional re-
quirements of the ACPA and the history of the dispute prior to
Lucent's filing of the lawsuit, the District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia granted the defendant's motion and dismissed
the case without prejudice. 169
The district court first noted that the in rem provisions of the
newly enacted ACPA were intended by Congress to "alleviate the
problem of anonymous cybersquatters, by allowing a mark owner
to file an action against the domain name itself, provided the
plaintiff could satisfy the court that it had exercised due diligence
in trying to locate the owner of the domain name but could not do
so.""' ° Specifically, the ACPA allows a plaintiff to proceed with an
in rem action against a domain name only after "sending notice of
the alleged violation and intent to proceed under [the ACPA to
the registrant of the domain name at the postal and e-mail ad-
dresses provided by the registrant to the registrar. " 1'7
The district court recognized that the ACPA does not require a
plaintiff to wait any specific amount of time after it mails and e-
mails its notice before filing an in rem action against the domain
name. 72 Nevertheless, the court ruled that filing suit only eight
days after serving notice was not sufficient to invoke the ACPA's
in rem jurisdiction. 3 The court held that the notice aspect of pro-
cedural due process set out in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank
& Trust Co.,"7' requires some period of time greater than eight
days. 1 5 Although the court did not establish the minimum
amount of time a plaintiff must wait to file suit after giving no-
tice, the court pointed out that other federal statutes that specify
167. Id. at 529.
16. See id. at 532.
169. See id. at 536.
170. Id. at 530.
171. Id. at 532 (quoting 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)(H) (Supp. 1999)).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
175. Lucent, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 533.
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a "waiting period" never specify one shorter than ten days.'76
F. Virginia Retail Franchising Act
In Crewe Auto Parts Co. v. Genuine Parts Co.,'77 the defendant
licensed independent auto parts store operators, or "jobbers," to
sell NAPA brand auto parts under NAPA signs and trade dress,
but had no written contracts with its jobbers defining their rela-
tionship. 7 Genuine Parts sold parts to jobbers at wholesale
prices, who then resold to wholesale or retail accounts.'79 Genuine
Parts charged its jobbers fees beyond the cost of parts, fees for
participation in NAPA's local and national advertising, and fees
for use of the NAPA on-line system for ordering parts.8 Partici-
pation in the advertising funds and use of the on-line system was
encouraged but not mandatory.'' Genuine Parts terminated the
plaintiff jobber for several reasons, including non-payment of his
account and failure to penetrate the local market sufficiently.8 2
The jobber sued Genuine Parts for violation of the Virginia Retail
Franchising Act section 13.1-564, which prohibits a franchiser's
cancellation of a franchise without reasonable cause. 3 The jobber
sought preliminary and permanent injunctions to prohibit termi-
nation." Genuine Parts filed a motion to dismiss the com-
plaint. 85
Following an evidentiary hearing, the District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia denied the jobber's motion for pre-
liminary injunction, finding that the relationship was not a fran-
chise under the Act.'86 First, the court found that there was no
written agreement between the parties, which is a necessary ele-
176. Id.
177. No. 3:00CV292, slip op. (E.D. Va. June 2, 2000).
178. Id. at 2-4.
179. Genuine Parts Company's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for
Preliminary Injunction at 3, Crewe Auto Parts Co. v. Genuine Parts Co., No. 3:00CV292,
slip op. (E.D. Va. June 2,2000).
180. Id. at 2.
181. Id. at 3.
182. Crewe, No. 3:00CV292, slip. op. at 5.
183. Petition for Temporary Restraining Order & Temporary & Permanent Injunction
at 13, Crewe Auto Parts Co. v. Genuine Parts Co., No. 3:00CV292, slip op. (E.D. Va.
June 2, 2000).
184. Crewe, No. 3:00CV292, slip. op. at 3.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 4.
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ment of a "franchise" under section 13.1-559(b) of the Act.1 7 Sec-
ond, the jobber had paid no franchise fee to Genuine Parts, also a
necessary element of a "franchise" under the same section of the
Act. 8 The district court went on to find that even if the relation-
ship were a franchise, it was terminated for reasonable cause as a
matter of law (the jobber did not contest the accuracy of the facts
supplying the reasons for termination).8 9 Moreover, the court
found that even if it were a franchise and the relationship were
terminated without reasonable cause, the Act provided only a
damage remedy to the terminated franchisee. 9 ° Therefore, the
jobber had an adequate remedy at law had he been unlawfully
terminated and would not have been entitled to injunctive relief.
Given the court's conclusion that the jobber would have "zero"
chance of recovery on the merits at trial for a permanent injunc-
tion, the court proceeded to grant Genuine Parts' motion to dis-
miss. '9
IV. VIRGINIA STATE COURT DECISIONS
A. Virginia Business Conspiracy Act
In Diamond Assembly Service of Martinsville v. Guthrie,'92 the
plaintiff "contracted with retail stores, such as Wal-Mart and
Home Depot, to assemble charcoal grills, bicycles and other con-
sumer goods" sold at the stores. 9 3 Diamond had its employees
sign non-competition agreements by which they agreed that, for a
period of six months following their employment with Diamond,
they would not work in a directly competing business.' 94 Defen-
dants violated their non-competition agreements by working for
one of Diamond's competitors.'95 Diamond sued for, and obtained,
injunctive relief enforcing their non-competition agreements.'96
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 5.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. 50 Va. Cir. 536 (Cir. Ct. 1999) (Roanoke City).
193. Id. at 536.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
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Pursuant to the Virginia Business Conspiracy Act, 9 ' Diamond
pursued its claim for damages for breach of the non-competition
agreements, attorneys' fees, and damages.'98
Judge Doherty, in his opinion for the Circuit Court for the City
of Roanoke, noted that in order to recover damages pursuant to
the Act, Diamond must show: (i) proof of a civil conspiracy by
clear and convincing evidence; (ii) that the conduct of defendants
in breaching their agreement was aimed at damaging Diamond's
business; and (iii) that Diamond's business was damaged as a re-
sult of the conspiracy.'99 The circuit court found that Diamond
failed to sustain its burden of proof on these issues, finding in-
stead that defendants individually and independently left their
employment with Diamond and sought comparable employment
for personal financial reasons, with no intent to harm Diamond's
business."' For this reason, the court granted judgment to defen-
dants on Diamond's statutory business conspiracy claims.2 '
B. Virginia Antitrust Act
In Reid v. Boyle, °2 the Supreme Court of Virginia considered
an appeal from a chancellor's judgment finding no violation of the
Virginia Antitrust Act2 3 by several defendants involved in the en-
tertainment industry in Tidewater.20 4 Sorting through the lengthy
and complex facts developed from the evidence taken ore tenus by
the chancellor below, the supreme court reviewed the following
facts relevant to plaintiffs antitrust claim. The plaintiff, formerly
president of Cellar Door Productions, was a concert and events
promoter in the Hampton Roads area.20 5 Reid and Cellar Door's
sole shareholder, defendant Boyle, previously had been in busi-
197. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-499 to -501 (Repl. Vol. 1996).
198. Diamond, 50 Va. Cir. at 536.
199. Id. at 537 (citing Multi-Channel T.V. Cable Co. v. Charlottesville Quality Cable
Operating Co., 108 F.3d 522, 526 (4th Cir. 1997); Peterson v. Cooley, 142 F.3d 181, 186
(4th Cir. 1986); Allen Realty Corp. v. Holbert, 227 Va. 441, 449, 318 S.E.2d 592, 596
(1984)).
200. Id.
20L Id. The court did, however, grant Diamond recovery of its attorneys' fees and costs
in connection with its successful recovery of injunctive relief. Id. at 538.
202. 259 Va. 356, 527 S.E.2d 137 (2000).
203. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-9.1 to -9.18 (Repl. Vol. 1998).
204. Reid, 259 Va. at 361, 527 S.E.2d at 140.
205. Id.
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ness together on several different ventures, including develop-
ment and construction of the GTE Virginia Beach Amphithea-
ter."6 A falling out between Reid and Boyle and the crumbling of
their business association, most of which involved undocumented
agreements and arrangements on profit-sharing, precipitated this
litigation. °"
Reid contended that following his termination from Cellar
Door, Boyle, Cellar Door, and various other defendants conspired
to prevent Reid and his new company from booking concerts at
two publicly owned concert venues-The Boathouse in Norfolk
and the GTE Virginia Beach Amphitheater-in violation of the
Virginia Antitrust Act.208 Reid presented evidence that the ability
to rent The Boathouse and the Amphitheater was essential to a
Virginia Beach concert promoter, given the demand by large con-
cert bands for these venues. 2 9 Reid also produced evidence that
the defendants controlled the large amphitheaters in both Vir-
ginia and North Carolina.2 0 Lastly, Reid presented evidence of
how his attempts to rent the two specified concert venues were
thwarted by various defendants.21'
The chancellor dismissed Reid's antitrust claims, finding no
violation of the Virginia Antitrust Act, and the Supreme Court of
Virginia affirmed that decision.212 Briefly reviewing the relevant
sections of the Act, the court found that Reid simply failed to pro-
duce evidence that would support a finding of "any contract or
conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce,... [or] a conspir-
acy, combination, or attempt by the defendants to monopolize
trade or commerce in the Commonwealth."2 11 Interestingly, the
court spent no additional time analyzing the facts or evidence
presented by Reid or those presented in opposition to such claims
by the defendants. Instead, in a rather terse holding as compared
to the lengthy examination of Reid's other claims, the court
merely found the record to be devoid of facts necessary to support
Reid's antitrust claim. 14
206. Id. at 363, 527 S.E.2d at 141.
207. Id. at 361-66, 527 S.E.2d at 140-43.
208. Id. at 374, 527 S.E.2d at 147.
209. Id. at 375, 527 S.E.2d at 148.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 374, 527 S.E.2d at 147.
212. Id. at 375, 527 S.E.2d at 148.
213. Id. at 375-76, 527 S.E.2d at 148.
214. Id. at 375, 527 S.E.2d at 148.
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C. Virginia Business Conspiracy Act
Finally, in the recent decision of Feddeman & Co. v. Langan
Associates, P.C.,215 the Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed and
reinstated a $3.3 million jury verdict in favor of plaintiff on its
claims of breach of fiduciary duty and statutory business conspir-
acy against its former employees and a competitor by whom they
subsequently were employed.216 Feddeman is a certified public ac-
counting firm that, in 1997, had thirty-one employees and over
three million dollars in annual revenues.21 Defendant Langan
Associates is a rival accounting firm. 218
In August 1996, Feddeman and Langan began discussing a
possible buyout or merger of the two companies.219 Shortly there-
after, the American Express Company made an offer to purchase
both Feddeman and Langan, which was refused.220 A Buying
Group emerged from Feddeman, consisting of several employees
and directors of Feddeman, which planned to purchase ownership
of Feddeman and then merge Feddeman with Langan.22' Kent
Feddeman, who was a ninety-five percent shareholder and presi-
dent of Feddeman, was aware of, and did not oppose, the pro-
posed merger process. 222
While offers were being negotiated and exchanged between the
Buying Group and Feddeman, the Buying Group solicited legal
advice on any potential liability that might arise if the merger
were unsuccessful and the Buying Group resigned and went to
work for Langan.22' The Buying Group's attorney advised that to
avoid liability, if they chose to resign, the Buying Group should
not: (1) solicit Feddeman clients or employees until after their
resignation; (2) use Feddeman resources in the preparation of
their resignation; (3) make negative or adverse statements about
Feddeman; or (4) remove Feddeman company property.2" There-
215. 260 Va. 35, 530 S.E.2d 668 (2000).
216. Id. at 47, 530 S.E.2d at 675.
217. Id. at 37, 530 S.E.2d at 670.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 38, 530 S.E.2d at 670.
220. Id.
22L Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 38-39, 530 S.E.2d at 670.
224. Id. at 39, 530 S.E.2d at 670.
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after, the Buying Group decided to resign on December 1, 1997 if
they had not reached a deal with Feddeman and that the resigna-
tions "would be a form of leverage that could be used, in the nego-
tiations."25 The proposed resignation, in fact, was relayed to sen-
ior Feddeman employees with the suggestion that the senior
employees would be taken care of in the deal.226
Following further negotiations and an announcement by Fed-
deman on December 1 that another national accounting firm
might be interested in purchasing Feddeman, the Buying Group
commenced its resignation plan.227 Once the Buying Group se-
cured the agreement of Langan to hire them, the Buying Group
resigned and also had letters of resignation prepared for other
senior Feddeman employees." By the morning of December 2,
the Buying Group tendered eleven total letters of resignation to
Feddeman. 2 9 That evening, Langan held a reception for those
Feddeman employees who had not yet resigned, following which
more Feddeman employees resigned °.2 " By December 3, a total of
twenty-five of the thirty-one Feddeman employees had resigned
and had begun working for Langan.2 3' All of Feddeman's clients
had been solicited, half of whom eventually transferred their
business to Langan.2
Feddeman thereafter filed a multi-count action against Langan
and former Feddeman employees asserting breach of fiduciary
duty, usurpation of business opportunity, and statutory business
conspiracy, among other claims. 233 Defendants counterclaimed
and a seven-day jury trial ensued.234 With the exception of one
former Feddeman director, the jury returned verdicts against all
defendants on all claims, including the counterclaims, awarding
Feddeman damages of $3.3 million.235 The trial court granted de-
fendants' motion to strike and to set aside the verdict from which
Feddeman appealed.23 6
225. Id.
226. Id. at 39, 530 S.E.2d at 670-71.
227. Id. at 40, 530 S.E.2d at 671.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 40-41, 530 S.E.2d at 671.
233. Id. at 41, 530 S.E.2d at 671-72.
234. Id. at 41, 530 S.E.2d at 672.
235. Id.
236. Id.
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On appeal, the court noted that, "prior to resignation, these de-
fendants were entitled to make arrangements to resign, including
plans to compete with their employer, and that such conduct
would not ordinarily result in liability for breach of fiduciary
duty." 7 Liability is imposed, however, when "employees or direc-
tors misappropriate[] trade secrets, misuse[] confidential infor-
mation, and solicit[] an employer's clients or other employees
prior to termination of employment." 8 The court found that de-
fendants did more than merely prepare to leave their employment
and advise others of their plan. Instead, they utilized the planned
resignation, which they knew would be harmful to the ongoing
business, as leverage during the buyout discussions, and they
planned to secure employees and clients of Feddeman for their
new employer, Langan.239 They even provided resignation letters
to other Feddeman employees and, within three days after their
departure, had solicited all of Feddeman's clients.24 This evidence
supported the jury's verdict that defendants' conduct fell below
the standard of good faith and loyalty required of employees and
directors.24'
Based upon these same facts, the court had little difficulty
finding a violation of the Virginia Business Conspiracy Act.242 The
court noted that establishing a statutory conspiracy does not re-
quire proof that the conspirators' "'primary and overriding pur-
pose is to injure another."'2  Instead, the employees' actions sim-
ply must be taken "intentionally, purposefully, and without
lawful justification."24
The court found that John Langan and Langan Associates,
with knowledge of the Buying Group's attempted buy-out and al-
ternate resignation plan, agreed to and supported the plan as a
means to secure the ultimate merger of Feddeman and Langan.245
The court found that defendants implemented the resignation
237. Id. at 42, 530 S.E.2d at 672.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 43, 530 S.E.2d at 673.
240. Id.
24L Id. at 44, 530 S.E.2d at 673.
242. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-499 to -501 (Repl. Vol. 1996 & Gum. Supp. 2000).
243. Feddeman, 260 Va. at 45, 530 S.E.2d at 674 (quoting Advanced Marine Enter. v.
PRO Inc., 256 Va. 106, 117, 501 S.E.2d 148, 154 (1998)).
244. Id. (quotingAdvanced Marine, 256 Va. at 117, 501 S.E.2d at 154-55).
245. Id.
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plan knowing that a resignation en masse of key Feddeman em-
ployees would so hurt the company that Feddeman would be
compelled to entertain the buy-out and ultimate merger of Fed-
deman with Langan.246 Langan facilitated the plan by providing
legal services and by agreeing to hire all Feddeman employees
who resigned, should the plan be implemented. 1 7 The totality of
these circumstances therefore supported the jury's finding that
defendants' conduct was taken intentionally, purposefully, and
without lawful justification.'
The court therefore reinstated the jury's verdict on all counts
but, because the court failed to consider entry of an award in ac-
cordance with the Virginia Business Conspiracy Act's trebling
provision, the court remanded the case for entry of a judgment
consistent with the court's opinion. 24 9
V. FTC ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS RELATING TO
VIRGINIA ACTIVITIES
A. FTC v. Maher 20
In FTC v. Maher, the defendant was charged with violations of
the Federal Trade Commission Act25' and the FTC's franchise
disclosure rules for disseminating false and misleading spain"
(unsolicited, commercial e-mail).252 In the e-mails at issue in the
case, the defendant offered to sell potential customers a business
opportunity. 3 The defendant guaranteed that the business op-
portunity would generate a specified level of profits, and guaran-
teed the customer a full refund if such profits were not realized.'
In reality, few purchasers of the business opportunity received
246. Id.
247. Id. at 45-46, 530 S.E.2d at 674.
248. Id. at 46, 530 S.E.2d at 675.
249. Id. at 47, 530 S.E.2d at 675. The Virginia Business Conspiracy Act provides that a
person injured in his business through a violation of Virginia Code section 18.2-499 may
recover "three-fold the damages by him sustained," together with costs and attorneys' fees.
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-500 (Repl. Vol. 1996 & Cum. Supp. 2000).
250. 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 24,397 (D. Md. Mar. 4, 1998), affd sub nom. FTC v.
Reed, 198 F.3d 236 (4th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (unpublished decision) (full text available
in LEXIS, No. 99-1883, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 24920).
251. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1994) (declaring unlawful unfair trade practices).
252. Maher, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 24,397.
253. Id.
254. Id.
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the specified profits, and none received a refund.255 This action
was the first to target fraudulent and misleading spai. 25 6 The
FTC demonstrated that it would enforce its rules against
fraudulent e-mail in the same way that it has enforced its rules
regarding fraudulent mail in the past."
The district court entered a default judgment in favor of the
FTC due to the defendant's failure to answer the complaint or to
file any other defensive pleadings. 258 The default judgment was
upheld by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit due to the
defendant's failure to fie a motion to set aside the default judg-
ment.
25 9
B. FTC v. Telebrands Corp.
260
The FTC's "Mail or Telephone Order Rule" requires companies
that take orders by mail, telephone, or computer to ship ordered
merchandise within the time stated in its advertising or, if no
time is specified, thirty days.2 If the shipment will not be made
on time, the company must notify the customer and provide him
with the option to cancel the order and receive a refund.2  In
1996, Telebrands was charged with violating this rule by failing
to notify consumers about delays and failing to cancel orders
when the customers did not consent to the delay.263 In settlement
of that charge, Telebrands entered into a consent decree and
agreed to pay a $95,000 civil penalty.2
Since 1996, Telebrands has repeatedly sent out late delay no-
tices and delayed shipments without its customers' consent.26 5 As
a result of these continued violations, in FTC v. Telebrands Corp.,
the District Court for the Western District of Virginia allowed the
FTC to modify its 1996 consent decree with Telebrands to require
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. FTC v. Reed, 198 F.3d 236 (4th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (unpublished table deci-
sion) (full text available in LEXIS, No. 99-1883, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 24920).
259. Id.
260. 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) % 24,643 (W.D. Va. Sept. 1, 1999).
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
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that the company fulfill enhanced recordkeeping requirements
and hire an expert in mail or telephone order fulfillment to moni-
tor its operations.266
C. FTC v. Leiss 267
In FTC v. Leiss, the defendant used the Internet and other me-
dia to advertise his service of helping consumers obtain new
credit histories.26 ' His service requested nine-digit employee iden-
tification numbers or taxpayer identification numbers to be used
by his customers in place of their social security numbers on
credit applications.269 Such a practice enabled the customers to
hide their past credit history and begin building a new credit
rating.' Defendant advertised that this practice was legal when,
in fact, it violated federal law. 271
In settlement of these charges, the defendant must provide re-
dress for consumers harmed by this scam, refrain from under-
taking a similar scam in the future, and notify past and current
customers that this practice is illegal under federal law. 272
D. FTC v. Erickson Agency, Inc.273
In FTC v. Erickson Agency, Inc., the defendants represented to
potential customers that they were highly selective talent man-
agement agencies.27 Their salespeople would approach potential
customers in public places (like shopping malls or train stations)
and state that the potential customer could become an actor or
model, that the agencies had placed many models and actors into
high profile jobs, and that the customer could expect to receive
substantial income from a modeling or acting job.276 In order to
increase potential customers' confidence in the agencies, the
266. Id.
267. 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 24,663 (E.D. Va. Oct. 21, 1999).
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 24,664 (E.D. Va. Oct. 14, 1999).
274. Id.
275. Id.
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agencies' representatives would also inform potential customers
that the agencies mainly profited from commissions on models
and actors who had been placed in jobs." 6
In reality, the agencies were not selective at all and paid their
salespeople a commission based on the number of actual custom-
ers they referred to the agency. 7 Furthermore, the agencies de-
rived most of their income from selling training materials to their
customers.7 8 Few customers, if any, ever received employment as
an actor or model. 9
The defendants settled these charges with the FTC and agreed
to stop assisting in the marketing or sale of modeling training
materials and services, and to refrain from deceptive sales prac-
tices.280 The settlement also precluded the defendants from col-
lecting outstanding payments due them and ordered the defen-
dants to provide some refunds.28'
E. Consent Order Regarding Dominion Resources, Inc.282
Dominion acquired Consolidated Natural Gas Company
("CNG"). 283 The merger raised antitrust concerns in the market
for the generation of electric power in southeastern Virginia.2 4
Dominion, through its subsidiary Virginia Power, accounts for
seventy percent of the electric power generation capacity in Vir-
ginia.285 CNG, through its subsidiary, Virginia Natural Gas, Inc.
("VNG"), supplies natural gas-one of the few fuels used in elec-
tricity generation-to southeastern Virginia.286 Concerns were
raised that entry into the power generation market in southeast-
ern Virginia would be deterred due to Dominion's control over a
vital supply of fuel for power generation.287 To resolve these anti-
trust concerns, Dominion agreed to divest VNG.2 8
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. See id.
280. See id.
281 Id.
282. 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 24,668 (Dec. 9, 1999).
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
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VI. NEW LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
A. Antitrust Technical Corrections and Improvements Act of
1999289
The Antitrust Technical Corrections and Improvement Act29°
would amend section 3 of the Sherman Act to clarify that prohibi-
tions against monopolizing, attempting to monopolize, or com-
bining or conspiring with others to monopolize trade or commerce
apply to activities in and among United States territories and the
District of Columbia as well as the states.291' The bill would also
redesignate Section 27(a) of the Clayton Act292 as section 28.293
The bill would strike a provision in the Panama Canal Act 294 that
prohibited persons who were in violation of the Sherman Act from
passing through the Panama Canal.295 Finally the bill would re-
peal a little used and redundant section of the Wilson Tariff Act296
and renumber the other sections of the Act accordingly.297
B. Antitrust Technical Corrections Act of 1999298
This bill is similar to the Senate version with the exception
that it does not redesignate section 27(a) of the Clayton Act, and
289. S. 1764, 106th Cong. (1999). This bill was sponsored by Senator DeWine and in-
troduced on October 21, 1999, before the Senate, at which time it was referred to the Judi-
ciary Committee. 145 CONG. REC. S13,019 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1999). On October 28, 1999,
the Judiciary Committee ordered the bill to be favorably reported to the Senate. Id. at
S13,401 (daily ed. Oct. 28, 1999). It was then placed on the Senate Legislative Calendar,
No. 352, available at http'J/thomas.loc.gov/.
290. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994).
291. S. 1764 § 2(b).
292. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1994 & Supp. 1998).
293. S. 1764 § 2(d).
294. Pub. L. No. 96-70, 93 Stat. 452 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5
U.S.C., 8 U.S.C., 22 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., 39 U.S.C., and 50 U.S.C) (1994).
295. S. 1764 § 2(a).
296. 15 U.S.C. §§ 8-11 (1994).
297. S. 1764 § 2(c).
298. H.R. 1801, 106th Cong. (1999). This bill was sponsored by Representative Hyde
and introduced on May 13, 1999, before the House of Representatives, at which time it
was referred to the House Judiciary Committee. 145 CONG. REC. H 3170 (daily ed. May 13,
1999). On October 25, 1999, the bill was reported to the House by the House Judiciary
Committee and placed on the Union Calendar, No. 237. Id. at H10,769. On November 2,
1999, the bill was passed by the House and on November 3, the bill was received by the
Senate. Id. at H11,318 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1999); id. at S13,794 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1999). On
November 19, 1999, the bill was placed on the Senate Legislative Calendar, No. 420. Id. at
S15,087 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1999).
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it would repeal the Act of March 3, 1913, which requires deposi-
tions taken in Sherman Act equity cases brought by the govern-
ment to be conducted in public.
299
C. Antitrust Merger Review Act300
This bill would amend section 7A of the Clayton Act3 °' to place
time limitations on the FCC's review of telecommunications
mergers. °2 When a license transfer application is filed, the FCC
would have thirty days to decide whether to make a "second re-
quest."30 3 If a second request is made, the FCC would then have
180 days after receiving the additional material to make a deci-
sion.304 The bill does not, however, change the scope of the FCC's
review of such mergers.0 5
D. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 199906
This bill would amend section 7A of the Clayton Act 0 7 to raise
the size-of-transaction threshold in 7A(a)(3)(B) to $35,000,000
and adjust that amount in the future to roughly correspond with
inflation.03 The bill would also make certain adjustments to the
filing fees under the Clayton Act30 9 and place certain limitations
on the scope of second requests by the Department of Justice and
FTC (and allow for review of such requests by a magistrate
judge).310
299. Antitrust Corrections Act of 1999, H.R. 1801, 106th Cong. (1999).
300. S. 467, 106th Cong. (1999). This bill was sponsored by Senator DeWine and intro-
duced on February 25, 1999 before the Senate, at which time it was referred to the Senate
Judiciary Committee. 145 CONG. REC. S2007 (daily ed. Feb. 25, 1999). On July 1, 1999, the
Senate Judiciary Committee reported the bill to the Senate favorably, with an amendment
in the nature of a substitute and was then placed on the Senate Legislative Calendar, No.
192. Id. at S8084 (daily ed. July 1, 1999).
301. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1994 & Supp. 1998).
302. S. 467 § 2(b)(1).
303. Id. § 2(e)(f).
304 Id. § 2(k)(4).
305. Id. § 2(k)(7).
306. S. 1854, 106th Cong. (1999). This bill was sponsored by Senator Hatch and intro-
duced on November 4, 1999, before the Senate, at which time it was referred to the Senate
Judiciary Committee. See 145 CONG. REC. S13,972 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1999). On May 25,
2000, the Senate Judiciary Committee reported the bill to the Senate favorably with an
amendment in the nature of a substitute. See 146 CONG. REc. S4459 (daily ed. May 25,
2000). It was then placed on the Senate Legislative Calendar, No. 576 (not yet published).
307. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1994 & Supp. 1998).
308. Id. § 2(b).
309. Id. § 3.
310. Id.§3.
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E. The Small Business Franchise Act of 1999311
The Small Business Franchise Act would federally regulate the
relationship between parties to a franchise agreement.312 It pro-
poses changes to franchise contracts primarily in the areas of
termination,3 13 succession,314 sourcing (supplies) 315 and encroach-
ment (locating a second franchise unit in close proximity to an
existing unit).316 It creates several new federal private rights of
action and would impose new obligations on franchisers.317
The bill has been referred to the House Judiciary Commercial
and Administrative Law Subcommittee, which is the same sub-
committee that conducted an oversight hearing on the franchise
relationship issue in June 1999.311
F. Small Business Merger Fee Reduction Act of 20003'9
The Small Business Merger Fee Reduction Act32° bill would
amend section 7A of the Clayton Act to raise the size-of-
transaction threshold in 7A(a)(3)(B) to $50,000,000.321 The bill
would also make certain adjustments to the filing fees.322
311. H.R. 3308, 106th Cong. (1999). This bill was introduced by Representative Howard
Coble on November 10, 1999, and has attracted forty-seven bi-partisan co-sponsors. See
145 CONG. REC. H11,953 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1999). Interest in federal franchise legislation
has increased somewhat as similar legislation in the last Congress only attracted twelve
co-sponsors.
312. See H.R. 3308.
313. Id. § 4.
314. Id. §§ 5, 8, 9.
315. Id. § 10.
316. Id. § 11.
317. Id. § 12.
318. 145 CONG. REC. H11,953 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1999).
319. H.R. 4194, 106th Cong. (2000). This bill was sponsored by Representative Rogan
and introduced on April 5, 2000 before the House of Representatives, at which time it was
referred to the House Judiciary Committee. See 146 CONG. REC. H1851 (daily ed. Apr. 5,
2000).
320. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1994 & Supp. 1998).
321. H.R. 4194 § 2.
322. Id. § 3.
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G. Antitrust Enforcement Improvement Act of 2000323
This bill would amend the Sherman Act,3" the Clayton Act,
325
and the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921326 to regulate compe-
tition among wholesale purchasers and establish a commission to
review large agriculture mergers, market concentrations, and
market power.127 The bill would also make certain adjustments to
the filing fees under the Clayton Act and increase fines on corpo-
rations under Sections 1 and 3 of the Sherman Act.328
VII. CONCLUSION
Unlike in the national arena, pure antitrust disputes have
played a diminished role in recent Virginia jurisprudence. As-
suming an increasingly significant role in commercial disputes,
both in state and federal court, is the powerful Virginia Business
Conspiracy Act, which contains the same remedies as the
Sherman Act, but does not require the impact on competition that
is needed for an antitrust violation. Another emerging trend in
trade regulation evident from the recent Microsoft and Napster
cases is the Internet's dominant role on the economy. As its eco-
nomic and business impact grows, so too will efforts to apply in-
tellectual property, antitrust, and trade regulation laws to that
burgeoning arena.
323. H.R. 4321, 106th Cong. (2000). This bill was sponsored by Representative Minge
and introduced on April 13, 2000, before the House of Representatives, at which time it
was referred to the House Judiciary Committee and the House Agriculture Committee.
146 CONG. REC. H2338 (daily ed. Apr. 13, 2000).
324. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994).
325. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1994 & Supp. 1998).
326. 7 U.S.C. §§ 181-231 (1994 & Supp. 1997).
327. H.R. 4321.
328. Id.
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